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ASCERTAINING THE TESTATOR'S INTENT:
LIBERAL ADMISSION OF EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less."
"The question is," asked Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."




It has long been the troublesome task of the courts to determine
what meaning a testator assigned to the words which he used in his
will.1 Until recently, the California courts had placed the word in the
position of master by applying strict, formalistic rules of interpretation
which regulated the admission of extrinsic evidence offered to prove
what the testator meant by the words he used. Under the doctrine
known as the plain meaning rule, if the word chosen by the testator
had a common, general and unambiguous meaning, evidence of a spe-
cial meaning which the testator actually attached to such word was in-
admissible.' Despite the fact that the testator misunderstood the legal
effect of his statements,3 the choice of a particular word was determi-
native of the testator's intent which the courts could never vary. Nor
could the courts admit evidence of extrinsic circumstances which would
prove or imply that the testator intended to attach a different meaning
to the word.4
A second restriction on the admission of extrinsic evidence to aid
in construction of wills was based on a maxim drawn by Lord Bacon
which differentiated between latent and patent ambiguities. Accord-
ing to this maxim, extrinsic evidence was only admissible to resolve la-
1. "[Wills and the construction of them do more perplex a man than any
other learning." Estate of Whitney, 162 Cal. App. 2d 860, 864, 329 P.2d 104, 107
(1958) (quotation from Lord Coke).
2. 4 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WiLLs § 32.10 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961).
[hereinafter cited as PAGE].
3. "[Tihe expressed intent will not be varied under the guise of correction be-
cause the testator misapprehended its legal effect .... [It will be presumed that he
designed that result." In re Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337, 343-44, 55 P. 1011, 1013
(1899).
4. In re Estate of Willson, 171 Cal. 449, 456, 153 P. 927, 930 (1915).
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tent ambiguities.' In recent decisions, however, the California courts
have shown a readiness to abandon these two formalistic rules and to
allow extrinsic evidence to prove and give effect to the testator's intent,
regardless of his choice of words. This development in California law,
long overdue, has made more meaningful section 101 of the Probate
Code which commands that "[a] will is to be construed according to
the intentions of the testator." Thus, the testator is now allowed to as-
sume his proper role of master over the word.
The Plain Meaning Rule
The plain meaning rule6 was a product of the stiff and super-
stitious formalism which characterized early English law. 7  Then, words
were considered to be magical symbols, each of which had a precise and
invariable meaning. Those who used words handled them with great
care, lest the courts, through their inflexible rules of construction and
highly technical rules of evidence, distort the meaning which they were
intended to convey. As a spirit of liberality emerged during the 1800's,
words, to a certain extent, lost their supernatural quality. It became
settled that if the testator's intent to use words in an uncommon sense
appeared on the face of the will, such contrary intent would be given
effect. But, absent such indication on the face of the will, no mean-
ing deviating from the accepted definition would be recognized despite
the conclusiveness of the evidence indicating that deviation.8
The plain meaning rule was incorporated into section 1324 of the
original California Civil Code, enacted in 1872. The statute provided:
The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and gram-
matical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another
sense can be collected, and that other can be ascertained.
Because there was no textual command to restrict the search for "an-
5. PAGE § 32.7. See note 44 & accompanying text infra.
6. This rule has also been referred to as the "single plain meaning rule," PAGE
§ 32.10; and the rule against "disturbing a clear meaning," 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2461 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
7. WIGMORE § 2461, at 187.
8. The reduction of this concept to a rule of construction may be attributed
primarily to Vice Chancellor Sir James Wigram who wrote in 1831: "Where there is
nothing in the context of a will from which it is apparent that a testator has used the
words in which he has expressed himself in any other than their strict and primary
sense, and where his words so interpreted are sensible with reference to extrinsic cir-
cumstances, it is an inflexible rule of construction, that the words of a will shall be
interpreted in their strict and primary sense, and in no other, although they may be
capable of some popular or secondary interpretation, and although the most conclusive
evidence of intention to use them in such popular or secondary sense be tendered."
J. WIGRAM, EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN AID OF THE INTERPRETATION OF WILLS 18
(4th ed. 1858) (emphasis in original).
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other sense" to the context of the will,9 it is at least arguable that the ab-
sence manifested a legislative intent to lessen the inflexibility of the
plain meaning rule. In the early cases applying the statute, however,
the courts did not look beyond the face of the will.10 In 1931, when
the California Probate Code was enacted, the above Civil Code section
was incorporated into Probate Code section 106.11 Under this section,
the courts continued to apply the same restricted search, holding that the
intent to use an uncommon meaning could only appear in the context
of the instrument itself.' 2 If the terms of the will were ambiguous'"
(i.e., had no "ordinary and grammatical sense"), an "uncertainty" arose
on the face of the will and, under Probate Code section 105,14 extrinsic
evidence was admissible to resolve the uncertainty.' 5 As stated in Es-
9. In the Code Commissioners' annotation to section 1324, eight cases are
cited to explain the intent and purpose of the section. Of these, one case allowed ex-
trinsic evidence to show that the testator intended to use a word in other than its ordi-
nary sense. Rathbone v. Dyckman, 3 Paige 9 (N.Y. Ch. 1831). The remaining cases
restricted the determination of the contrary intent to the context of the will. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1324 (1878), now CAL. PROB. CODE § 106.
10. In In re Estate of Willson, 171 Cal. 449, 153 P. 927 (1915), the court said:
"[Wjhere . . . taking the words of the will alone, intent is clear, that intent must be
followed, and proof that the testator desired other results or that the circumstances
were such that such desire might be inferred is inadmissible." Id. at 456, 153 P. at 930;
accord, In re Estate of Watts, 186 Cal. 102, 105, 198 P. 1036, 1037 (1921); In re
Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 530, 64 P. 1000, 1002 (1901); In re Estate of Tompkins,
132 Cal. 173, 176, 64 P. 268, 269 (1901); In re Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337, 343-44,
55 P. 1011, 1013 (1899); In re Estate of Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 659, 41 P. 772,
780 (1895); In re Estate of Reinhardt, 74 Cal. 365, 368, 16 P. 13, 14 (1887).
11. CAL. PROB. CODE § 106 provides: "The words of a will are to be taken in
their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another
sense can be collected, and that other can be ascertained. Technical words are not
necessary to give effect to any species of disposition by a will; but technical words in a
will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a con-
trary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the
testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense."
12. E.g., Estate of Wochos, 256 Cal. App. 2d 338, 341, 63 Cal. Rptr. 924, 927
(1967); Estate of Hill, 214 Cal. App. 2d 812, 816, 29 Cal. Rptr. 814, 816 (1963);
In re Estate of Somerville, 38 Cal. App. 2d 463, 468, 101 P.2d 533, 536 (1940).
13. A distinction, however, was drawn by the courts between latent and patent
ambiguities appearing in the will and, until recently, extrinsic evidence was admissible
only to resolve the latent form. This distinction and its recent demise is dis-
cussed beginning at the text accompanying footnote 38 infra.
14. CAL. PROB. CODE § 105 provides: "When there is an imperfect description, or
no person or property exactly answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be
corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic evidence,
excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his intentions; and when an un-
certainty arises upon the face of a will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testators intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into view the
circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations."
15. Estate of Clancy, 159 Cal. App. 2d 216, 222, 323 P.2d 763, 767 (1958).
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tate of Loescher:'6
The intention sought for is not that which may have existed
in the mind of the testator but is that which is expressed in the lan-
guage of the will, giving such language, if clear, its ordinary mean-
ing, and if ambiguous, the meaning it should have, in the light of
the context and the circumstances shown to explain the mean-
ing.' 7
In 1968, however, the California Supreme Court's decision in
Estate of Russell'8 signaled the demise of the plain meaning rule. Mrs.
Russell had executed a valid holographic will in which, aside from be-
quests of two items of personal property to a relative, she left "every-
thing I own Real & Personal to Chester H. Quinn and Roxy Russell."
The plaintiff, Mrs. Russell's niece and only heir-at-law, filed a petition
to determine heirship. At the hearing, extrinsic evidence was intro-
duced to show that Roxy Russel was the testatrix's dog and thus ex-
cluded by Probate Code section 271' from taking under a will. Plain-
tiff therefore contended that the share bequeathed to Roxy must fail
and pass by intestate succession. Over plaintiff's objection, counsel
for defendant (Quinn) introduced evidence to show that the testatrix
intended to leave everything to Quinn, who was to provide for Roxy's
maintenance and support."° The lower court found Quinn's evidence
persuasive, holding that the language of the will leaving property to
Roxy was precatory in nature. Accordingly, the entire residue was
awarded to Quinn. On appeal, the heir-at-law contended that because
the wording of the will was clear and unambiguous, the admission of
extrinsic evidence to support Quinn's contention was error. The su-
preme court reversed the lower court's decision-but did not base its
decision on the ground that the lack of ambiguity rendered extrinsic
evidence inadmissible. Rather, the court held that no language could
be deemed free from ambiguity until it has been examined in the light
of the extrinsic circumstances surrounding the execution of the will.
In this case, although such evidence was properly admitted, it failed
to support the lower court's interpretation of the testatrix's intent.2 '
16. 133 Cal. App. 2d 589, 284 P.2d 902 (1955).
17. Id. at 594, 284 P.2d at 905-06.
18. 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968).
19. CAL. PROB. CODE § 27 lists beneficiaries who may take under a will. The
listing does not include animals.
20. The dog was alive on the date of execution of the will, but it predeceased the
testatrix. 69 Cal. 2d at 203, 444 P.2d at 355, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
21. The court noted that "the infinitesimal portion of the extrinsic evidence ac-
tually referring to the care of the dog was devoid of all probative value." 69 Cal. 2d at
215 n.21, 444 P.2d at 363 n.21, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 571 n.21. The gift to the dog was
void, and the property subject to the lapse passed by intestacy to Mrs. Russell's heir-at-
law. Id. at 216, 444 P.2d at 364, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
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Regarding the admissibility of evidence, the court enunciated the fol-
lowing rule:
In order to determine initially whether the terms of any written
instrument are clear, definite and free from ambiguity the court
must examine the instrument in the light of the circumstances sur-
rounding its execution so as to ascertain what the parties meant by
the words used. Only then can it be determined whether the
seemingly clear language of the instrument is in fact ambiguous.
"Words are used in an endless variety of contexts. Their meaning
is not subsequently attached to them by the reader but is formu-
lated by the writer and can only be found by interpretation in the
light of all the circumstances that reveal the sense in which the
writer used the words. The exclusion of parol evidence re-
garding such circumstances merely because the words do not ap-
pear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a
written instrument of a meaning that was never intended" [citation
omitted].
22
The court then applied this general doctrine of interpretation to wills:
[E]xtrinsic evidence of the circumstances under which a will is
made (except evidence expressly excluded by statute)2 3 may be
considered by the court in ascertaining what the testator meant by
the words used in the will. If in the light of such extrinsic evidence,
the provisions of the will are reasonably susceptible of two or
more meanings claimed to have been intended by the testator,"an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will" (§ 105) and ex-
trinsic evidence relevant to prove any of such meanings is admissi-
ble (see § 106).24
This decision places a new interpretative gloss on section 106.
Courts are no longer confined to the text of the will in their search for
contrary intent. Extrinsic evidencd is now admissible to show that the
apparently clear and unambiguous language of the will is in fact ambig-
uous. Sections 105 and 106 are to be applied in the following man-
ner: If the extrinsic evidence does not reveal a reasonable alternative
interpretation, section 106 commands that the terms must be used in
their ordinary and common sense. 25 If, however, the extrinsic evi-
dence does reveal a reasonable second interpretation, the will is deemed
22. Id. at 208-9, 444 P.2d at 359, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 567. This rationale is sup-
ported by the leading text writers. See PAGE, supra note 2, § 32.10-.11; WIGMoRE,
supra note 6, H9 2470-78; B. WrKIN, CALrFoRNiA EVIDENCE, H§ 730-32 (2d ed. 1966);
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.
REV. 161 (1965).
23. "As for example, under section 105 ...which specifically excludes 'the oral
declarations of the testator as to his intentions'. This opinion does not disturb the
statutory proscription against the use of such evidence." 69 Cal. 2d at 212 n.18, 444
P.2d at 361 n.18, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 569 n.18.
24. Id. at 212, 444 P.2d at 361, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
25. "If. . .in the light of such extrinsic evidence, the provisions of the will are
not reasonably susceptible of two or more meanings, there is no uncertainty arising upon
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to be ambiguous, and section 105 will permit the admission of ex-
trinsic evidence to discover the testator's intent.26
Four months later in Estate of Balyeat,27 a California court of ap-
peal indicated the extremes to which the courts were willing to go un-
der the rule enunciated in Russell. In Balyeat the testatrix had desig-
nated as residual beneficiaries her two sons who were to take equally.
She then added an in terrorem provision under which were disinherited
"each, any and all persons whomsoever claiming to be or who may be
lawfully determined to be heirs at law of mine"28 who contested any
part of her will. In a codicil added 2 years later, the testatrix provided
that the residue was to be placed in trust for 3 years. The income from
the trust, and the corpus after the 3-year period, were to be divided
equally between the sons.29 After the death of the testatrix, both sons
contested the validity of the codicil but later dismissed the action.3"
The lower court refused to admit extrinsic evidence offered by one of
the sons to prove that the testatrix included the in terrorem clause to pro-
tect the interests of the sons from third parties. The court ruled that
" 'as a matter of law the in terrorem clause is clear and it is. . .a matter
of law whether filing the contest and then dismissing it is sufficient to
bring the in terrorem clause into being.' "1 The lower court held
that it was sufficient, and that the residue passed by intestate succession.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that under the Russell3 2 deci-
sion it was error not to receive such evidence. The court reasoned that
since the overall design of the will was to pass the testatrix's property to
her sons, their contention that the purpose for inclusion of the in ter-
rorem provision was to protect the sons' interests was reasonable under
the circumstances. Therefore, extrinsic evidence should have been ad-
mitted to prove this interpretation.33
Although the terms of the will in question were clear and gave
no indication that the in terrorem clause was to be applied in a manner
different from its usual application, i.e., to all contestants, neverthe-
less this clear language could be modified by an intention proved purely
the face of the will (§ 105; [citations omitted]) and any proffered evidence attempting
to show an intention different from that expressed by the words therein, giving them
the only meaning to which they are reasonably susceptible, is inadmissible." Id.
26. See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
27. 268 Cal. App. 2d 556, 74 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1968).
28. Id. at 558, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
29. Id. at 558-59, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
30. The contestants claimed, first, that the testatrix was of unsound mind when
she added the codicil, and second, that the codicil was improperly executed. Id. at 559,
n.1, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 122 n.1.
31. Id. at 560, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (quoting probate court ruling).
32. Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968).
33. 208 Cal. App. 2d at 562-63, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
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by extrinsic evidence. Balyeat therefore stands for the proposition that
a contradiction between the clear and unambiguous terms of the will
and a contrary intent based solely on extrinsic facts will constitute the
"uncertainty arising on the face" of the will required by section 105
of the Probate Code. There is no necessity that particular words in the
will be shown to be ambiguous.
The effect of these decisions is to abrogate the plain meaning rule
in California. Following the policy of the legislature, as manifested in
the Probate Code,34 California courts had consistently held that the
testator's intent was to govern construction of the will. 35 The discovery
of that intention however, had often been made more difficult by the
arbitrary requirement that the contrary intent be ascertained from the
context of the instrument. 36 California courts have dealt a death blow
to this rule of no utility and have made the testator master of the
words he used.37
Latent v. Patent Ambiguities: Admissibility
Before full meaning could be given to section 101 of the Probate
Code, the California courts had to repudiate the irrational distinction
which the rules of evidence had made between latent and patent am-
biguities. Simply stated, a latent ambiguity could be resolved by ex-
trinsic evidence; a patent ambiguity could not be so resolved. 38  Be-
fore tracing the development of this distinction, it may be useful to ex-
plain the meaning and application of the terms "latent ambiguity" and
"patent ambiquity."
A latent ambiguity is one which is not apparent upon the face of
the instrument, but appears when the terms of the will are applied to the
testator's property and designated beneficiaries. In In re Estate of
Donnellan,39 for example, the testatrix left a portion of the residue of
34. CAL. PROB. CODE § 101.
35. E.g., Estate of Thompson, 50 Cal. 2d 613, 617, 328 P.2d 1, 3 (1958); Rosen-
berg v. Frank, 58 Cal. 387, 404 (1881).
36. Cases cited notes 10 & 12 supra.
37. This abrogation of the plain meaning rule in wills construction follows an al-
most identical development in contract interpretation. Recent cases involving contracts
have held that all credible evidence is admissible to prove that language which appears
to be unambiguous is susceptible of two or more reasonable interpretations. Once the
susceptibility is shown, extrinsic evidence is then admissible to prove which interpre-
tation the parties intended. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968); Delta Dynamics,
Inc. v. Arioto, 69 Cal. 2d 525, 446 P.2d 785, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1968); Note, Chief
Justice Traynor and the Parol Evidence Rule, 22 STAN. L. RaV. 547 (1970).
38. See Taylor v. McCowen, 154 Cal. 798, 802, 99 P. 351, 353 (1908);
PAGE, supra note 2, at 254-59.
39. 164 Cal. 14, 127 P. 166 (1912).
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her estate to "my niece Mary, a resident of New York, said Mary being
the daughter of my deceased sister Mary."4 0  The sister of the testatrix
had two daughters: Mary, who lived in Ireland, and Annie, who re-
sided in New York. Only when these extrinsic facts were known did the
ambiguity arise.
A patent ambiguity, on the other hand, is one which appears on the
face of the will. 41  For example, in Estate of Akeley, 42 the testatrix,
purporting to bequeath the entire residue of her estate, gave 25 percent
to each of three charities.4" The ambiguity is, of course, apparent from
the terms of the will alone, as the testatrix had disposed of only 75 per-
cent of the balance of her estate.
This distinction was originally formulated by Lord Bacon in 1597
as Rule 25 of his Maxims.44 Bacon theorized that if extrinsic evidence
were admitted to resolve a patent ambiguity, the result would be to
give effect to the testator's desires which had not been reduced to a
40. Id. at 16, 127 P. at 167.
41. PAGE, supra note 2, § 32.7, at 255.
42. 35 Cal. 2d 26, 215 P.2d 921 (1950).
43. Id. at 28, 215 P.2d at 922.
44. Sir Francis Bacon wrote, "There be two sorts of ambiguities of words; the one
is 'ambiguitas patens' and the other is 'ambiguitas latens.' 'Patens' is that which ap-
pears to be ambiguous upon the deed or instrument; 'latens' is that which seemeth cer-
tain and without ambiguity for anything that appeareth upon the deed or instrument,
but there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth the ambiguity.
'Ambiguitas patens' is never holpen by averment, and the reason is, because the law
will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is of the higher account, with
matter of averment, which is of inferior account in law; for that were to make all deeds
hollow and subject to averments, and so, in effect, that to pass without deed, which the
law appointeth shall not pass but by deed. Therefore, if a man give land to 'I. D. et
I. S. Hoeredibus,' that do not limit to whether of their heirs, it shall not be supplied by
averment to whether of them the intention was the inheritance should be limited ...
But if it be 'ambiguitas latens,' then otherwise it is. As I grant my manor of S. to I. F.
and his heirs, here appeareth no ambiguity at all upon the deed; but if the truth be that
I have the manors both of South S. and North S., this ambiguity is matter in fact; and
therefore it shall be holpen by averment, whether of them it was that the parties
intended should pass. . . . Another sort of 'ambiguitas latens' is correlative unto this:
for this ambiguity spoken of before is, when one name and appellation doth denominate
divers things; and the second is, when the same thing is called by divers names. As, if
I give lands to Christ Church in Oxford, and the name of the corporation is 'Ecclesia
Christi in Universitate Oxford,' this shall be holpen by averment, because there appears
no ambiguity in the words: for the variance is matter in fact. But the averment shall
not be of the intention, because it does not stand with the words. For in the case of
equivocation the general intent includes both the special, and therefore stands with the
words: but so it is not in variance; and therefore the averment must be a matter
that doth induce a certainty, and not of intention; as to say that the precinct of 'Oxford'
and of 'the University of Oxford' is one and the same, and not to say that the intention
of the parties was that the grant should be to Christ Church in the University of Ox-
ford." F. BACON, MAXIMS, rule xxv, quoted in WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2472, at 239.
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writing with the requisite formalities. Thus, in the example of the
residue given to three charities,45 if extrinsic evidence proved that the
testatrix had actually intended that each of the three charities receive
one-third of the residue, the court would be compelled to give that
fraction to each charity. The court would be giving effect to a scheme
which had never been formally executed, thereby sanctioning a violation
of the Probate Code. 0
From the above type of ambiguity, Bacon distinguished the "latent"
ambiguity but used this term in a highly restricted and technical
sense. Bacon intended to only include cases of "equivocation," where
"one name and appellation doth denominate divers things; and . . .
when the same thing is called by divers names."4  Under these cir-
cumstances, the variance between the terms of the will and the actual
property or persons which the testator intended to describe was a fac-
tual variance. If extrinsic evidence were used to resolve the ambiguity,
the result would be to make the terms of the will sufficiently specific, not
to give effect to an unexecuted intention. To use Bacon's example as
an illustration, a testator devised his manor S to A and his heirs, but in
fact the testator owned two manors, North S and South S.48 If the
court admitted extrinsic evidence to show that the testator intended
North S, it has not, strictly speaking, added anything to the terms of
the will; it has only made those terms more specific. As the will pro-
vided, a manor named S will pass by inheritance to A and his heirs.
49
The term "latent ambiguity" has since been extended beyond
equivocations to include all ambiguities not apparent on the face of the
will, but which appear when an attempt is made to administer the pro-
visions of the will.50 This extention is the result of a misinterpreta-
tion of the Bacon Maxim, for the rationale upon which he based his
rule will not support the admission of extrinsic evidence to clarify latent
ambiguities other than equivocations. An example of such an am-
biguity may be found in In re Estate of Donnellan,5' which concerned
the gift of the residue to "Mary, a resident of New York." It is a latent
ambiguity but not an equivocation, for there is no general description
which fits two possible beneficiaries. To admit extrinsic evidence, as
was done in that case, to prove that Annie, the New York resident,
was the intended beneficiary effected a disposition to "Annie" when the
45. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
46. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 50. Section 50 is the California Statute of Wills.
47. See note 44 supra.
48. Id.
49. See 14 STAN. L. REv. 409 (1962).
50. E.g., In re Estate of Little, 170 Cal. 52, 54, 148 P. 194, 194 (1915); In re
Estate of Donnellan, 164 Cal. 14, 20, 127 P. 166, 168 (1912).
51. 164 Cal. 14, 127 P. 166 (1912).
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will clearly stated "Mary." The terms of the will were not made more
specific by the extrinsic evidence; rather, the court disposed of the prop-
erty in a manner contrary to the expressed intent of the will. But Ba-
con believed that it was desirable to avoid this result; for that reason his
Maxim forbade the use of extrinsic evidence to resolve patent ambigui-
ties. Thus, the rationale which led to the distinction between patent
and latent ambiguities was ignored, while the rule continued to be ap-
plied. Moreover, the meaning and application of the term "latent
ambiguity" has been further expanded by the rule enunciated in the
landmark case of Patch v. White:52 If extrinsic evidence discloses an
ambiguity, then extrinsic evidence should be used to resolve it.53
Many writers have attacked the distinction between latent and
patent ambiguities, regarding it as unnecessary and an "unprofitable
subtlety."54  The Restatement of Property, in its adopted rules of con-
struction, recognizes no difference between latent and patent ambigui-
ties,55 and many states have abandoned the distinction altogether for
purposes of determining admissibility of extrinsic evidence.56
The draftsmen of the California Civil Code of 1872 codified the
distinction drawn by Lord Bacon, although they did not employ the
terms "latent" and "patent." Section 134057 dealt with imperfect de-
scriptions found when the court applied the will to persons or property
(latent ambiguities) and section 131858 pertained to uncertainties aris-
ing upon the face of the will (patent ambiguities). Section 1340 fol-
lowed the general rule that extrinsic evidence was admissible to resolve
all latent ambiguities. But section 1318 did not adopt the principle
52. 117 U.S. 210, 217 (1886).
53. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2470; see Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 47 (1935).
54. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw
424 (1898). "Generally speaking, ambiguities, or any other difficulties, patent or
latent, are all alike as regards the right and duty to compare the documents with ex-
trinsic facts ...... Id. at 425; accord, PAGE, supra note 2, § 32.7, at 258; WIGMORE,
supra note 6, at 2473-75; Warren, Interpretation of Wills-Recent Developments, 49
HARV. L. REV. 689, 705 (1936).
55. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 241, comment a (1940).
56. E.g., Bratton v. Trust Co. of Ga., 191 Ga. 49, 56, 11 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1940);
State Trust Co. v. Pierce, 126 Me. 67, 136 A. 289 (1927); Rowe v. Strother, 341 Mo.
1149, 1154, 111 S.W.2d 93, 96 (1937); see Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 55-65 (1935).
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1340 (1872) provided: "When, applying a will, it is
found that there is an imperfect description, or that no person or property exactly an-
swers the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears
from the context of the will or from extrinsic evidence; but evidence of the declara-
tions of the testator as to his intentions cannot be received."
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1318 (1872) provided: "In case of uncertainty aris-
ing upon the face of a will, as to application of any of its provisions, the testator's in-
tention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into view the circum-
stances under which it was made, exclusive of his oral declarations."
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which excluded extrinsic evidence for purposes of resolving patent am-
biguities, as it allowed the court to consider the circumstances under
which the will was made. The earlier cases, however, ignored the
statutory language of section 1318 and held that extrinsic evidence was
inadmissible when offered to resolve a patent ambiguity. 9
In 1960 the California Supreme Court declared in Estate of Tor-
regano0 that "[e]xtrinsic evidence is . . . admissible to explain an
ambiguity arising on the face of a will, or to resolve a latent ambiguity
which does not so appear."61 As authority the court cited Probate Code
section 105, 62 which had incorporated both sections 1318 and 1340 of
the 1872 Civil Code. Since Torregano, the courts have found no
necessity to distinguish between latent and patent ambiguities and
have admitted extrinsic evidence to resolve all ambiguities.63
This abolition of the distinction between patent and latent am-
biguities is logically correct because the rationale which supported the
Bacon Maxim is no longer accepted.64  Bacon believed that the writ-
ten word had an inherent potency which required that any alteration
of meaning be indicated by the writing itself. Today words are no
longer regarded as magical symbols,6" but only as the means by which
a writer expresses his intentions and desires. The goal of interpretation
is the ascertainment of that intention or desire, and modem courts are
repudiating formalistic rules which exclude relevant evidence tending
to cast light on the meaning which the testator had ascribed to the
59. In re Estate of Dominici, 151 Cal. 181, 90 P. 448 (1907); In re Estate of
Young, 123 Cal. 337, 55 P. 1011 (1899); In re Estate of Greenwald, 19 Cal. App. 2d
291, 65 P.2d 70 (1937). But see In re Estate of Kurtz, 190 Cal. 146, 149, 210 P.
959, 960 (1922) ("Evidence is always admissible to show extrinsic facts which serve
to explain the meaning of ambiguous words appearing on the face of a will.").
In Young the testatrix's holographic will directed to "my husband, my bank book
shall be handet [sic] to him, with gold watch and chain, also two deeds. After my hus-
band deatts [sic] the two deeds shall go to Katharine Muhr." Enclosed in the envelope
with the will were two deeds which represented real property owned by the testatrix
at her death. The court held that the two deeds, even though clearly part of the
circumstance, were inadmissible because "parol evidence is never admissible to explain
a patent ambiguity" and cited Civil Code section 1318 as authority. 123 Cal. at 342,
55 P. at 1012.
60. 54 Cal. 2d 234, 352 P.2d 505, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1960).
61. Id. at 246, 352 P.2d at 512, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
62. See note 14 supra.
63. E.g., Estate of Mohr, 7 Cal. App. 3d 641, 86 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1970); Estate of
Black, 211 Cal. App. 2d 75, 27 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1962); Estate of Lyon, 201 Cal. App.
2d 638, 20 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1962). But see Estate of Jones, 55 Cal. 2d 531, 360
P.2d 70, 11 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1961), where it was held that extrinsic evidence consisting
of the testator's oral declarations was inadmissible under Probate Code section 105.
This case is discussed in the text accompanying note 75 infra.
64. See note 22 & accompanying text supra.
65. See id.
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words he chose. Thus the California courts have taken an important
step towards fulfilling the statutory directive that the "will is to be con-
strued according to the intention of the testator."66
Admissibility of the Testator's Oral Declarations
An additional limitation upon the admissibility of extrinsic evi-
dence to assist in ascertaining the testator's intent is found in the lan-
guage of Probate Code section 105, which prohibits the admission of
the testator's oral declarations as to his intentions.67 This limitation
was based upon the same rationale which fostered the Parol Evidence
Rule: if parties integrated an agreement in a written memorial, their
oral utterances should have no bearing upon the legal effect of terms
of the writing. 68 The danger of perjury was simply too great to al-
low admission of such utterances, especially in wills cases where the
declarant was deceased.
The California courts, however, have long recognized an exception
to the rule. In In re Estate of Dominici69 the supreme court held that
oral declarations made to the scrivener of the will were admissible to
resolve a latent ambiguity. The court, noting that the California statu-
tory proscription forbidding admission of oral declarations was con-
trary to the prevailing American and English law,'70 declared that:
[The prohibition] will not be extended, therefore, beyond its
actual language, and will be held to apply to the mere incidental
fugitive utterances or declarations of intent, as distinguished from
the specific instructions [as to testamentary disposition] which it
may be proved were given.71
The opinion clearly limited this exception to the resolution of latent am-
biguities,7 2 citing as authority the "familiar rule of evidence that a
66. CAL. PROB. CODE § 101.
67. The text of this section is set forth in note 14 supra.
68. PAGE, supra note 2, § 32.9, at 271; WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2425.
69. 151 Cal. 181, 90 P. 448 (1907).
70. When a description equally fits two persons or things, such an ambiguity may
be removed "by any evidence either of circumstances or declarations of the testator."
Id. at 185, 90 P. at 450, quoting 2 AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
298 (2d ed. 1898).
71. 151 Cal. at 185, 90 P. at 450.
72. The decision restricted the exception to latent ambiguities "where there are
two persons or things equally answering the description," or equivocations. Id. at 185,
90 P. at 450. Later cases interpreted the decision as standing for the proposition that
oral declarations were admissible to resolve all latent ambiguities. In re Estate of
Little, 170 Cal. 52, 54-5, 148 P. 194 (1915); Estate of McDonald, 191 Cal. App. 2d
565, 571, 12 Cal. Rptr. 823, 826 (1961); Estate of Nunes, 123 Cal. App. 2d 150, 158,
266 P.2d 574, 578 (1954). This broadening of the use of the term "latent ambiguity"
beyond equivocation and concomitantly, beyond the rationale which originally justified
the application of a different rule to this form of ambiguity, is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
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doubt arising from extrinsic evidence may be removed by extrinsic
evidence. 73  The substantial majority of the cases decided since Do-
minici have followed the strict formulation of this exception. 74 The
California Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the California rule that
oral declarations would not be admitted to clarify a patent ambiguity
in Estate of Jones.75 Prior to the Jones decision, two cases had indi-
cated that the Dominici exception might be expanded to include patent
ambiguities. 70  In Estate of Resler7t 7 the court held that if a will were
ambiguous about the amount of a bequest, that ambiguity-whether
latent or patent-could be resolved by the testator's oral declarations.78
But the court in Jones ignored the Resler decision and held that Pro-
bate Code section 105 expressly prohibits admission of the decedent's
oral statements as to his testamentary plans and intentions. The court,
however, did distinguish the line of decisions which admitted such evi-
dence to resolve latent ambiguities.
79
At least one writer has wondered why the California courts anach-
ronistically insist on perpetuating this distinction between latent and
patent ambiguities in determining the admission of the testator's oral
declarations.80 In the recent decisions which have permitted the ad-
mission of extrinsic evidence other than oral declarations to clarify un-
certain provisions,"' the courts found no logical reason or statutory
mandate to distinguish between the two classes of ambiguities. Nor is
there any additional reason to discriminate between these two classes
when the testator's oral declaration is the evidence in question. It is
true that a witness might distort the deceased's testamentary intent
through perjured testimony about his conversations with the testator.
73. 151 Cal. at 186, 90 P. at 450.
74. E.g., Estate of Carter, 47 Cal. 2d 200, 302 P.2d 30 (1956); In re Estate of
Greenwald, 19 Cal. App. 2d 291, 65 P.2d 70 (1937).
75. 55 Cal. 2d 531, 539, 360 P.2d 70, 75, 11 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579 (1961).
76. Estate of Resler, 43 Cal. 2d 726, 278 P.2d 1 (1954); Estate of Pierce, 32
Cal. 2d 265, 196 P.2d 1 (1948). In Estate of Pierce the court held that oral declara-
tions offered to resolve a patent ambiguity were inadmissible because not made to a
scrivener and "therefore do not come within this exception." 32 Cal. 2d at 274, 196
P.2d at 6-7. This language implied that, if the oral declarations had been made to a
scrivener, they would be admissible to resolve a patent ambiguity.
77. 43 Cal. 2d 726, 278 P.2d 1 (1954).
78. Id. at 734-5, 278 P.2d at 6; accord, Estate of Hansell, 133 Cal. App. 2d 665,
669-70, 284 P.2d 821, 824 (1955).
79. Estate of Jones, 55 Cal. 2d 531, 539, 360 P.2d 70, 75, 11 Cal. Rptr. 574,
579 (1961). This decision was not affected by Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200,
44 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968), in which it was specifically stated that that
decision was not to disturb the proscription embodied in Probate Code section 105.
See note 23 supra.
80. 14 STrAN. L. REv. 409 (1962).
81. See note 63 & accompanying text supra.
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But this danger exists, to the same degree, when the ambiguity is latent
as when it is patent. This fear of perjury did not prevent the California
Supreme Curt from resolving a latent ambiguity by relying upon evi-
dence consisting solely of oral declarations to the scrivener. 2
Recent California cases have made a subtle distinction between oral
declarations which manifest the decedent's "intentions" and those which
indicate his "state of mind." Under this questionable differentiation,
the latter form of evidence is admissible, whether the ambiguity is patent
or latent.83 For example, in Estate of Fries,84 the testatrix, using a
printed form for her will, failed to state to whom she was bequeathing
or devising all her property. Faced with this patent ambiguity, the
court allowed the husband to testify that the testatrix had orally prom-
ised to bequeath her entire estate to him. The court was of the opin-
ion that this evidence was offered not to prove the intention of the tes-
tatrix, but to prove her "state of mind with respect to the meaning of
particular language used by [her] in a will which is ambiguous."85
This evidence was therefore admissible because "the proscription [of
Probate Code section 105] does not apply to oral declarations of a tes-
tator which are offered for the purpose of showing his state of mind." 6
In the subsequent case of Estate of Gilliland87 the court of appeal held
that the testator's oral declarations made to friends and servants should
be admitted to prove a "state of mind" directly contradictory to the
plain language of the will. The court believed that such evidence was
82. In re Estate of Little, 170 Cal. 52, 148 P. 194 (1915). The exception
carved out of the proscription of Probate Code section 105 in Dominici was limited by
that decision to oral declarations made by the testator to the scrivener. The court
found "a broad difference between testimony of the casual remark of a man as to his
intention . . . and the positive instructions which he has given to his attorney in the
very performance of the testamentary act .. " In re Estate of Dominici, 151 Cal. 181,
185, 90 P. 448, 450 (1907). The recent cases, however, have ignored this distinction
and broadened the exception to include such declarations made to a nonscrivener. Es-
tate of Balyeat, 268 Cal. App. 2d 556, 74 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1968) (declarations made to
friends & servants held admissible); Estate of Glow, 208 Cal. App. 2d 613, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 416 (1962) (to beneficiaries of the testamentary trust); Estate of Doody, 204
Cal. App. 2d 419, 22 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1962) (to a legatee); Estate of Nichols, 199 Cal.
App. 2d 783, 19 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1962) (to friends and a legatee).
83. Estate of Mohr, 7 Cal. App. 3d 641, 86 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1970); Estate of
Gilliland, 276 Cal. App. 2d 258, 80 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1969); Estate of Fries, 221 Cal.
App. 2d 725, 34 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1963). See also Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 280 (1935);
PAGE, supra note 2, at 274.
84. 221 Cal. App. 2d 725, 34 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1963).
85. Id. at 730, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 753. Contra, Estate of De Moulin, 101 Cal. App.
2d 221, 255 P.2d 303 (1950), which held oral declarations made to the scrivener in-
admissible in a similar factual situation on grounds that Probate Code section 105
precluded admission of such evidence.
86. 221 Cal. App. 2d at 730, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 753 (1963).
87. 276 Cal. App. 2d 258, 80 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1969).
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made admissible by Estate of Russell8" to show that plain language is in
fact ambiguous."9
Although the distinction between "intention" and "state of mind"
in the context of the above two cases is questionable, it does provide a
method of circumventing the statutory prohibition of Probate Code
section 105. The willingness of the courts to go to such extremes
strongly suggests that the provision serves only as an obstacle to the ad-
mission of reliable evidence. It is clear that there is a trend in the rules
of evidence which favors the admission of all relevant extrinsic evi-
dence. Additionally, the fear of perjury has not precluded the courts
from admitting the testator's oral declarations to resolve latent am-
biguities, 0 or to prove his "state of mind."91  Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that a statutory revision should entirely eliminate the prohibitory
language of the statute. The tides of change and common sense have
dashed its rational underpinnings, leaving only a law which serves no
useful purpose.
Summary
It is now settled that extrinsic evidence will be admitted to dem-
onstrate that a will, although clear and unambiguous on its face, is
in fact ambiguous. If the proffered evidence shows that the provisions
of the will are reasonably susceptible of two or more alternative inter-
pretations, additional extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove which
of the interpretations the testator intended.9" The intent of the testator
is controlling, not his mistaken or imperfect attempt to express that
intent.
Additionally, if a will contains either a latent or patent ambiguity,
extrinsic evidence is now admissible to resolve the uncertainty.93 Again,
the disposition actually intended by the testator is to be given effect,
and extrinsic evidence is admissible to ascertain that intent regardless
of how the ambiguity in the will is classified.
There remains only one remnant of the old common-law policy
which excluded extrinsic evidence in most probate cases-the statutory
provision of Probate Code section 105 prohibiting the admission of the
testator's oral declarations regarding his intentions. 94 This restriction
is based upon the premise that the written word was omnipotent, a con-
88. 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968).
89. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 264, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
90. In re Estate of Dominici, 151 Cal. 181, 90 P. 448 (1907). See notes
69-74 & accompanying text supra.
91. Estate of Gilliland, 276 Cal. App. 2d 258, 80 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1969). See
text accompanying notes 83-89 supra.
92. Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968).
93. Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234, 352 P.2d 505, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1960).
94. See note 14 & text accompanying note 67 supra.
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cept which has been expressedly repudiated by the California Supreme
Court in Estate of Russell" and in the recent cases concerning con-
tract interpretation. 6  The function of the court today is to give effect
to the intentions of the testator, not to protect the sanctity of the written
word; and any statutory prohibition preventing admission of evidence
relevant to the search for the testator's intent cannot be justified. The
only issue should be the weight to be given to the extrinsic evidence of-
fered, an issue to be resolved by the finder-of-fact in the particular
litigation.
The California courts have done much to eliminate from the proc-
ess of interpretation of wills those rules based upon outmoded princi-
ples. The burden of reform now rests upon the California Legislature
to complete this modernization by eliminating statutes which arbitrarily
exclude extrinsic evidence. A statute allowing admission of all rele-
vant extrinsic evidence is needed. Only then will the testator be fully
elevated to his proper position of master over the words he used.
Robert S. Boyd*
95. 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968). See text accom-
panying notes 18-24 supra.
96. See note 37 supra.
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